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Abstract 
The idea of freedom is a central figure in the ideology of neoliberalism.  In the contemporary 
context, neoliberals argue that rolling back regulations and the marketization of social life 
create more choices and thus more freedom.  While this position in fact dissimulates the 
increasing powerlessness of ordinary people, it also has roots in older philosophical 
arguments—in particular in the work of the economist and philosopher F.A. Hayek, whose 
thought has been a central inspiration for neoliberal policy. I begin my discussion here with an 
analysis of his concept of freedom.  I believe that the ideologeme of freedom is central to 
securing neoliberalism’s persistent hegemony, and that it needs to be engaged by critics at some 
depth.  In spite of the failures and suffering produced by neoliberalism in practice, it retains a 
moral appeal for many, and not only those who are its principal beneficiaries.  This appeal rests 
on the supposed symbiosis—and even identification—of neoliberalism (and capitalism itself) 
with freedom.  Therefore, a critical-theoretical investigation of the philosophical and ideological 
architecture of this equation is urgent.  In this article, I undertake this investigation in order to 
reveal the specific structures of violence that are the actual and positive content of neoliberal 
freedom. 
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 The idea of freedom is a central figure in the ideology of neoliberalism.  In the 
contemporary context, neoliberals argue that rolling back regulations and the marketization of 
social life create more choices and thus more freedom.  While this position in fact dissimulates 
the increasing powerlessness of ordinary people, it also has roots in older philosophical 
arguments—in particular in the work of the economist and philosopher F.A. Hayek (1944/2007; 
1960/2011), whose thought has been a central inspiration for neoliberal policy.  I begin my 
discussion here with an analysis of his concept of freedom.  I believe that the ideology of 
freedom is central to securing neoliberalism’s persistent hegemony, and that it needs to be 
engaged by critics at some depth.  In spite of the failures and suffering produced by 
neoliberalism in practice, it retains a moral appeal for many, and not only those who are its 
principal beneficiaries.  This appeal rests on the supposed symbiosis—and even identification—
of neoliberalism (and capitalism itself) with freedom.  Therefore, a critical-theoretical 
investigation of the philosophical and ideological architecture of this equation is urgent.  In this 
article, I undertake this investigation in order to reveal the specific structures of violence that are 
the actual and positive content of neoliberal freedom. 	  
Beyond the contradictions at the level of philosophy, we also live neoliberal freedom in 
the present through particular experiences of responsibilization, vulnerability, and even 
destitution, and it is important to analyze this category at this level as well.  Neoliberal freedom 
operates in this context less at the level of rules and rights, and more at the level of ways of 
being, constructing kinds of subjectivity which themselves already embody the impossible 
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contradictions that characterize neoliberalism as doctrine and policy.  A critical, and critical-
pedagogical, response has to be able to expose these determinations as well and to struggle to 
create the possibility of other subjects—and the subjects of other possibilities.  The irony is that 
in a world that has been decided by neoliberalism what we may most need to be freed from is its 
vaunted “freedom” itself.  If, as I argue, neoliberal freedom is ultimately a profound form of 
capture, then critical pedagogy needs to work with students to imagine, against it, an 
emancipatory project that is itself only made real within a collective struggle against power and 
domination.	  
 
F.A. Hayek: Freedom, Idealism, and Violence 	  
 For F.A. Hayek, the Austrian philosopher, economist, and social theorist whose work has 
been a crucial source for and influence on neoliberal theory and practice, freedom in the first 
instance means freedom from coercion: “We are concerned…with that condition of men in 
which coercion of some by others is reduced as much as is possible in society.  This state we 
shall describe throughout as a state of liberty or freedom” (1960/2011, p. 57).  Hayek 
distinguishes this sense of freedom from a notion of freedom as indicating a lack of physical 
constraint, and also from political freedom proper (participation in the choice of government).  
Most importantly, Hayek distinguishes his notion of freedom from that which identifies it with 
the condition of being able to do or have whatever one wants.  He argues that this latter notion is 
expressed in the redistribution of resources carried out by socialism, which he condemns as 
confused and dangerous.  In his own minimalist definition, which defines freedom through a 
negative—the lack of coercion—Hayek seems in the first instance to hold to a classically liberal 
formulation.  This minimalism allows him to claim a certain definitional purity and to avoid the 
ambiguity of competing usages, even if it does not rule out constraint entirely.  That is, if a free 
society does not avoid coercion altogether, he argues, at least it reduces it to a minimum by 
countenancing its limited use by the state solely in order to prevent more harmful forms of 
private coercion. 	  
 In fact, Hayek is ultimately impatient with an entirely negative account of freedom.  
Rejecting a pure laissez-faire position with regard to government, he believes that political, 
social, and economic conditions can be optimized for the exercise of freedom, and for the growth 
and development at which, he argues, freedom aims.  Thus, interventions by the state, if 
undertaken with care, can secure the conditions in which freedom flourishes.  This belief in the 
possibility of positive action is the first sense in which his philosophy departs from a purely 
negative and formal position.  Second, he argues that the essential moment of freedom in 
contemporary society is in the economic sphere, and that the growth of commerce has been 
intimately connected to the deepening of freedom in modernity.  This identification of freedom 
broadly with “industrial freedom” (Hayek, 1944/2007, p. 70) gives the concept a historical 
content.  His thesis here is the foundation for the properly neoliberal precept that identifies 
freedom with the capitalist market, and the exercise of freedom with the accumulative drive.  
Freedom for Hayek, like nature for Rousseau, is not automatically or immediately accessible; 
rather, through the careful work of law and policy the ground must be cleared of that which 
militates against it. 	  
 It is this apparently paradoxical turn, in which the optimal conditions for a freedom that is 
fundamentally suspicious of the state are achieved through a series of calculated state 
interventions, that Foucault (2008) explicates in terms of the idea of neoliberal governmentality.  
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As Foucault argues, neoliberalism does not in fact seek to do away with the state.  Rather, it aims 
to insinuate its own rationale of competition and entrepreneurialism into the very heart of 
government.  We can see this particularly in the neoliberal account of the law.  Thus, the law for 
Hayek is stripped of transcendent purpose; its function is solely instrumental:  “The ideal type of 
law, on the other hand, provides merely additional information to be taken into account in the 
decision of the actor” (1960/2011, p. 218).  The law should not substitute the goals of 
government for that of the individual.  Instead, the law should serve to stabilize the social 
environment, letting actors know what conditions they can count on and what they are 
responsible for.  As with economic policy, law should serve to optimize conditions for the 
exercise of freedom, understood as freedom to compete and to accumulate.  And this is not just 
an analogy, since according to Hayek economics provides a crucial foundation for intelligent 
governance more broadly:	  
Much of the opposition to a system of freedom under general laws arises from the 
inability to conceive of an effective co-ordination of human activities without deliberate 
organization by a commanding intelligence. One of the achievements of economic theory 
has been to explain how such a mutual adjustment of the spontaneous activities of 
individuals is brought about by the market, provided that there is a known delimitation of 
the sphere of control of each individual.  An understanding of that mechanism of mutual 
adjustment of individuals forms the most important part of the knowledge that ought to 
enter into the making of general rules limiting individual action. (1960/2011, p. 229) 
Not only does Hayek link the terrain of the law to the terrain of economics in this 
passage, but he also argues that the same rationale of “effective coordination” underlies, or 
should underlie, both spheres.  This coordination is achieved through a stability secured through 
effective rule making.  It is through this notion of law as delimitation that Hayek squares the 
circle of individual freedom vs. state administration, and it is under cover of this theory that 
actually existing neoliberalism justifies government actions on behalf of capital: these actions, it 
argues, only clear the ground of impediments to commerce.  Implicit in Hayek, and explicit in 
neoliberal policy, is the idea that freedom means freedom to compete and accumulate; and in an 
account in which society is understood as capitalist market, the proper actor can ultimately only 
be the possessor of capital, or in fact capital itself.	  
 In this way, neoliberalism offers up a brutally realist idealism.  The seductiveness of 
Hayek, for those with material or ideological investments in the status quo, is that he sets out a 
highly abstract and formal system of law and governance, uncompromising in its principles and 
untroubled by competing goals, which seems at the same time to be fully embodied in 
contemporary society.  As if it were a kind of perverse Buddhism, Hayek’s lofty theory 
illuminates the perfection of reality itself—but in his case this means the perfection of a freedom 
grounded in the market, the perfection of a world ordered and organized by capital.  Hayek’s 
philosophy belongs to that rare species of idealism that has muscled its austere strictures into 
reality itself.  But once firmly established as reigning ideology and rationality, it is precisely this 
idealist austerity that allows neoliberalism to be oblivious to its actual effects, and to the 
suffering that it everywhere creates.  Of course, this obliviousness is already demanded as a 
central principle by this philosophical system, which refuses any evaluation in terms of the 
consequences it produces.  Thus, for Hayek, the actual effects of the freedom he recommends on 
individuals are quite independent of its essential virtue.  Indeed, “to be free may mean freedom 
to starve, to make costly mistakes, or to run mortal risks” (1960/2011, p. 69).  Likewise, the 
extreme inequality that this market freedom produces is not merely unavoidable, he argues, but 
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desirable, since inequality allows the privileged to pioneer new ways of life and to marshal 
resources leading to civilizational advance. 	  
 Hayek’s hostility to the welfare state is not so much based on the immediate effect of its 
systems of provision, but rather on the threat they pose to the proper ordering of conditions for 
freedom.  As he would have it, the careful engineering required to lay the groundwork for 
freedom as competition is destroyed by obtrusive protections for workers and the poor.  Thus, 
the monetarism that he recommends in terms of economic policy, which seeks above all to check 
the growth of inflation, aims not only to stabilize conditions for investors and savers but also to 
prevent the growth of state services and benefits (which he believes accelerate as a response to 
inflation) as well as the Keynesian consensus that supports them (Hayek, 2006/2011, p. 465).  
This regulatory growth contaminates the purity of the freedom Hayek contemplates, which is 
represented in the contention of competing capitals.  But what is optimized of course in this 
competition is not really the freedom of the individual, but rather power’s own freedom, and the 
growth of power for itself, which is ultimately Hayek’s main concern—even if this accumulation 
is represented as the advance guard of a more general progress.  Under this banner, Hayek’s 
system transmutes the drive to domination into virtue.  In Hayek, the revanchist impulse that 
Duménil and Lévy (2005) describe as mobilizing neoliberalism’s assault on working people 
globally and its draining of resources from periphery to center is made elegant; the very violence 
of capitalism glitters as if it were the geometric proof of the philosopher’s thesis.  Is it any 
wonder that the intellectual sheen—and cover—offered by this philosophy has been so 
irresistible for those who view the world from positions of command?	  
 
Experiences of Neoliberal Freedom: Flexibility and Responsibilization	  
  
Hayek’s understanding of freedom does not result in a simple opposition between the 
individual and society.  In fact, he emphasizes that as society develops, we are more and more 
dependent, as individuals, on knowledge that is embodied in shared customs and institutions, 
which are the result of adaptations over generations:  
It might be said that civilization begins when the individual in the pursuit of his ends can 
make use of more knowledge than he has himself acquired and when he can transcend 
the boundaries of his ignorance by profiting from knowledge he does not himself 
possess. (2006/2011, p. 73) 
According to Hayek, there is a broad stock of collective knowledge, embodied not only in 
science but even in social habits, that crucially orients the actions of individuals.  In this regard, 
his emphases anticipate in unexpected fashion the work of contemporary theorists such as Hardt 
and Negri (2004, 2009), who have described the collective intelligence and creativity that 
increasingly organize social production.  The essential difference, of course, is that for Hayek 
collectivity and collaboration are simply effects of and platforms for the principle of competition, 
since they arise out of a process of adaptation in which unsuccessful forms of organization are 
discarded, and since they serve as a starting point for competitive innovations.  In this way, 
rather than the isolated individual being counterposed to the networked collectivity, this entire 
ensemble is unified by the principle of competition that works through it.  One is tempted to see 
in neoliberalism, as prefigured by Hayek, a kind of frightening Hegelian resolution to the 
dialectic between the individual and the organic community, in which the conduct of both poles 
of this opposition comes to express a fundamental entrepreneurial rationale.	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 Actually existing neoliberalism apparently coheres with this aspect of Hayek’s vision.  
On the one hand, “teamwork” has become a key trope and modality of work and leisure, and a 
range of dimensions of human sociability and communicativity have been incorporated within 
the process of capital accumulation (especially in the service industries).  Other kinds of freedom 
as well—especially freedom as flexibility—have increasingly come to characterize the labor 
process.  Thus, Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) document the transition in post-Fordist France 
from a paradigm of business management based on hierarchy and individualized meritocracy (in 
the 1960s) to one based on autonomy, teamwork, and “leadership” (beginning in the 1990s).  In 
this new management paradigm, the authority of the boss is replaced by a working environment 
apparently characterized by trust, creativity, and self-control.  The underlying objective of 
management becomes the mobilization of personal skills and capacities rather than the direction 
of activity from the top down.  Boltanski and Chiapello recount how firms deliberately co-opted 
radical demands of the 1960s for greater creativity and autonomy, divorcing a movement toward 
workplace freedom and conviviality from the critique of capitalist exploitation with which it had 
been connected in the protests of the time.  Clearly, the shift that they describe is widespread 
beyond France itself, and has only accelerated since their study was undertaken.  Furthermore, 
flexibilization has increasingly dispensed with its veneer of worker-friendliness, as on-demand 
production and service schedules throw lives into chaos and poverty.  In this context, autonomy 
as precarity proves the unity of freedom and competition that Hayek described, while also 
preserving the dark outline of his austere definition of freedom itself: true freedom as freedom to 
starve.  In this historical progression, freedom becomes, paradoxically, the mode in which we 
most perfectly live our own domination, as Wendy Brown (2003) points out.	  
 In education as well, neoliberalism has to some extent involved a devolution of 
responsibility for control and discipline from the system to the individual, while maintaining the 
authorities’ power of ultimate decision.  The moral framework of the contemporary educational 
accountability apparatus consists in the idea that teachers and students are ultimately solely 
responsible for learning “outcomes.”  At the less privileged end of the schooling spectrum this 
means inviting poor students and students of color to blame themselves (for the sin of attending 
under-resourced and punitive schools).  At the more privileged end of the spectrum this means, 
for students, being responsible for investing in oneself as the embodiment of a continually 
accumulating cultural, symbolic, and academic capital.  Not only does this invitation to an 
entrepreneurial orientation reorganize the experience of grade school; in addition, Simons and 
Masschelein (2008) show how a process of lifelong learning as optimization of human capital is 
associated with a paradigm shift in education more broadly—toward what they call the “learning 
apparatus.”  In this context, neoliberalism sets us free to manage our own educational portfolio.  
The degree of our initiative in this regard determines not only our employability, but also our 
personal fulfillment and sense of virtue.  A “rich” life for the successful learner as portfolio 
builder depends on a fidelity to the neoliberal imperative to make the most of every opportunity 
(O’Flynn & Peterson, 2007).  Importantly, “success” here is tied to the mobilization of an 
effectively experienced autonomy, a process of responsibilization with which students identify.  
Likewise, failure within the logic of the neoliberal learning apparatus is supposed to be 
understood in terms of this autonomy and responsibility—as a bad choice that itself proves the 
freedom of the neoliberal subject. 	  
 Neoliberal freedom as governmentality, for Foucault (2008), is a rationality that 
organizes the relationships of subjects to themselves—as entrepreneurs of their own human 
capital—at the same time that it reconstructs the meaning of government at the level of the state 
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itself.  But in addition, as Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2005) study indicates, the structure of 
neoliberal freedom works at the system level as a powerful strategy for evading the immanent 
contradictions of capitalism.  On the terrain of production, post-Fordism’s shift to a framework 
of autonomy, self-control, and collaboration works to render the sclerotic apparatus of 
accumulation newly supple.  On the terrain of policy and ideology, the shift in neoliberalism to a 
grammar of choice, responsibility, and self-actualization works as an update to capitalism’s 
clunky operating system—seeming to recognize and even “empower” individuals within a 
system which was always before thought to reduce and disempower them (Harvey, 2005).  But 
this paradoxical reconciliation of opposites—freedom as internalization of control, 
empowerment as isolation in competition—in fact puts the lie to late capitalism’s impressive 
sheen.  The shift to teamwork, communication, and networks that is the signature of this era 
takes shape after all within a system characterized ultimately by a logic of predation, and in this 
context our impulses to affiliate and collaborate in material and intellectual labor become an 
important instrument of exploitation, including in “creative” and educational occupations.  Thus, 
if the image of freedom in neoliberalism seems to reconcile irreconcilable opposites, the actual 
content of neoliberal freedom is ultimately invasion, speed-up, and surveillance.	  
 For this reason it is important to understand neoliberal freedom in terms of ideology, and 
not simply in terms of a grammar of power.  However, it is not so much that we are tricked into 
believing that we are free in neoliberalism, but rather that the seductive image of this freedom 
works as a symbolic compensation for our actual precariousness.  For instance, the proliferating 
systems of choice in education (i.e. networks of charters, magnets, and demonstration schools) 
seek to dazzle us at the same time that a broader disinvestment in public schooling proceeds 
apace.  This is not exactly false consciousness, but it suggests that much of what we learn to 
desire and consume in neoliberalism’s new landscapes of choice in fact ends up making us, 
collectively, fractured and vulnerable rather than liberated.	  
 
Invasion of the Body Snatchers: Real Subsumption and Subjective Destitution 
	  
 Critical theorists have described the way that alienation in late capitalism is obscured and 
submerged by the false needs of a one-dimensional consumerist society (Marcuse, 1991).  But 
neoliberalism goes one step further in that there is a shift in it from this submerged alienation to a 
condition of colonization and enclosure of social potentiality.  In this process, the space of 
alienation itself—the ultimate estrangement of self from society—is itself enclosed, so that 
power comes to invest and control both poles of the contradiction.  In this context, our most 
authentic struggles for well-being and self-expression (e.g. mental and physical self-care, 
romantic relationships, or spiritual practices) are organized in an entrepreneurial mode and seem 
to be just one more expression of the neoliberal ethos.  Even the most intimate modalities of 
freedom now seem to belong to power. 	  
A crucial effect of this shift is that senses of freedom that cannot be articulated in 
neoliberal terms appear delusional and incoherent.  Within neoliberalism’s logic of “capitalist 
realism” (Fisher, 2009), individual or collective emancipatory projects that would challenge 
neoliberalism’s basic conditions are refused; such projects become fantastic, obsolete, or 
unintelligible.  In particular, revolutionary struggles are constructed as vestiges of an archaic 
period and as expressing an embarrassing ideological backwardness.  Neoliberalism seeks to 
transform precisely the realism of revolutionary movements—a realism that focuses on decisive 
contradictions, and which recognizes that meaningful change must occur at the level of the social 
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whole—into a naïve idealism, which supposedly does not recognize the proper limits of the 
imagination. 	  
 This transformation in the meaning of freedom in the present can be helpfully understood 
in relation to the process in late capitalism of real subsumption.  As Marx (1867/1976) explains, 
in real as opposed to formal subsumption, capitalism not only comes to monopolize the means of 
production, but actually to absorb and transform the relations of production—the conditions and 
modes of work.  Society is in this way fundamentally molded by capital.  This idea has been 
pressed further by Negri (2003), who argues that in real subsumption (and contemporary 
capitalism) all use-value becomes exchange-value, capital occupies society as a whole, and work 
becomes the very “time of life.”  In this process, as capital invests and absorbs being and 
imagination, subjectivity itself becomes a crucial site of political antagonism and struggle.  
Liberation, from this perspective, is more than a struggle against processes of exploitation in 
production, or against dominant forms of ideological common sense; liberation means a struggle 
for different ways of being, different temporalities, and different subjectivities.  While Negri’s 
vision of exodus from the time of capital is rather hard to imagine in the context of the actual 
enclosures of neoliberalism, his analysis is generative.  In particular, the idea of real subsumption 
allows us to bring together a Marxist analysis of capital with a Foucauldian consideration of 
governmentality, as Read (2009) points out.  At this point of intersection, the meaning of 
freedom has to be investigated in terms of the politics of the subject.  In other words, the 
questions “Are we free?” and “What kind of freedom do we have?” have to be explored together 
with the questions “Who are we?” or “What have we become?” 	  
 The 1978 remake of the science fiction horror film Invasion of the Body Snatchers 
dramatizes this neoliberal condition.  In the film, an extraterrestrial species takes over the 
identities of the inhabitants of San Francisco, first producing (in immense pods) replicas of 
people’s bodies, and then absorbing their minds while they sleep.  In contrast to the original 1956 
version of the film, which can be analyzed in terms of cold-war paranoias regarding ideological 
conformity (of either the left or the right), the nature of the invasion in the 1978 remake is more 
subtle and disturbing: the horror is not that the body-snatching invaders make everyone the same 
in relation to one another, but rather that as the invasion occurs everyone remains the same.  In 
other words, what is most frightening in the remake is that we are invaded and absorbed without 
any noticeable ripple in the surface of our lives and society: we are made alien within our very 
self-identification.  Indeed, as the protagonists in the film worry about what is happening to their 
partners and neighbors, it turns out that the hip psychotherapist (played by Leonard Nimoy) who 
helps them to work through these anxieties has in fact already been taken over by the invaders.  
This is the creeping horror of neoliberalism and real subsumption: that in authentically becoming 
ourselves we end up merely expressing the system’s inner reason.  Ultimately the lesson of the 
film is not that we are threatened by frightening invaders; rather, it is that we ourselves, in 
ourselves, are already alien.	  
 To put these reflections in the context of the consideration of freedom, we might say that 
in neoliberalism it is not so much that our freedom is false (as in older forms of alienation), but 
rather that it is we who are false.  Real subsumption encloses and collapses the contradiction 
between the alienated and the authentic, and colonizes the truth of the subject.  It is not only the 
emphasis on freedom as competition in markets that is important in Hayek and fellow-travelers, 
then, but also the subject of freedom that their accounts presume.  In short, capitalism needs to be 
thought about here in terms of ontological invasion. In the context of this process of invasion, a 
critical sense of emancipation will have to upset the terms within which we are allowed to 
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coherently construct ourselves.  In education, and for critical pedagogy in particular, this points 
to the necessity not just of familiar kinds of critique, but also of praxis at the level of ways of 
being.	  
 
Against Neoliberal Liberty: Starting Points for Critical Pedagogy 	  
 The first task for a pedagogy against neoliberalism—and against neoliberal freedom—is 
to challenge the prevailing definition of freedom itself.  It is important to return to Hayek to 
interrogate the narrowness of the simple definition he offers for freedom: the absence of coercion 
directed against individuals.  Teachers ought to consider with students other meanings for 
freedom, especially senses that Hayek polemicizes against: freedom as collective struggle for 
justice, freedom as political liberty and political voice, and freedom as freedom from oppression 
and exploitation.  These senses persist in the shadows of the prevailing abstract and 
individualistic definition; they can be recovered and explored in critical pedagogical work across 
the curriculum. 	  
Of course, it is also important to recognize the limits of the account given by Hayek even 
of his own minimalist definition, which is modeled for him on the idea of market freedom.  
Against Hayek, freedom from coercion for the individual might instead be taken to refer to 
liberty not just in relation to the state, but also from the increasingly immoderate demands of 
capital; it might include liberty to imagine and create outside of the narrow ideological limits of 
the given.  And we have not even broached the innumerable contradictions between the 
minimalist liberal maxim and the actual neoliberal reality: in particular that a system supposedly 
founded on a suspicion of the state in favor of the citizen has overseen an unprecedented growth 
in the state’s carceral and security apparatuses (Wacquant, 2009), a remarkable expansion of 
surveillance, and a proliferation of special bureaucracies—including the bureaucracy of 
neoliberal educational accountability (Hursh, 2007).  These contradictions should be explored by 
critical educators.	  
 However, the reconfiguration of work, education, and social relationships in the 
neoliberal era also enrolls us into subjectivities and ways of being that work below and beyond 
ideological common senses (De Lissovoy, 2015).  The entrepreneurial self, which is also a self 
prepared for particular regimes of communication, flexibility, and surveillance on the job or in 
the classroom, secures the rule of neoliberalism in its very postures, habits and dispositions.  A 
critical pedagogy aiming to work at this level has to engage students in an investigation that is 
embodied, emotional, and ethical as much as it is ideological.  Neoliberal accountability in 
education—which is essentially an unceasing audit and indictment, offered up in the form of 
standardized tests, behavior management plans, and systems of “value-added” measurement of 
teachers—lays the foundation for anxious subjectivities terminally attuned to their personal 
statistical troughs:  to skills needing improvement, to lagging potentials, and to gaps in 
“achievement.”  To expose and challenge this regime is to consider our own deeply embodied 
performances and performativities (Ball & Olmedo, 2013).  Here a teacher’s actions and affects, 
his or her invitations to a different set of educational relationships, are crucial; these should 
propose kinds of communication and solidarity that can unravel the tightly wound knot of 
neoliberal subjectivity.  For example, admitting and acknowledging in the classroom dialogue a 
range of emotional responses—including anxiety, anger, resistance, and even boredom—as 
starting points for critical inquiry is a first step to understanding the contradictions that young 
people in school must live as students in the neoliberal era.  Once acknowledged, these feelings 
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can be explored and analyzed in relation to the social and political structures of which they are 
the effect (or to which they respond).	  
 Freire (1996) described the processes of “adhesion” to the oppressor and “fear of 
freedom” which secure oppressive social systems and banking models of education at the level 
of subjectivity.  We ought to revisit Freire’s psychoanalytic inquiry in the context of the present 
day.  What is the glue that holds together the neoliberal subject?  What secures the submission of 
that subject, at the level not just of belief but also of habit and practice, to the foreshortened 
horizons of austerity and competition?  A crucial clue here is in the way that power in 
neoliberalism works through the permission of specific kinds of autonomy, and not simply 
through marginalization.  Thus, in the present, students and teachers may not so much be afraid 
of freedom (Freire’s original diagnosis), as anxious in their autonomy.  Just as firms in post-
Fordism tend to externalize the costs of control to workers themselves (Boltanski & Chiapello, 
2005), neoliberal schooling makes students responsible for their own integration or lack of 
integration into systems of opportunity and structures of identification.  Penalties and rewards are 
represented as following automatically on personal choices.  In this context, a key task for 
critical pedagogy may be to pry students away from this anxious autonomy and to introduce the 
possibility of other social temporalities (Negri, 2003) and other notions and practices of freedom.  
In this context, the hope that Freire emphasized as central to critical pedagogy becomes a hope 
not just that the world might be different, but that we ourselves might be built from different 
imaginations and desires, and that we might be released from a fragmentation that isolates us in 
ourselves.	  
 In short, it may be that a basic task for critical pedagogy in the present is to rescue 
students from the isolation of their vaunted “freedom.”  Students today are “free” to navigate 
hostile educational environments; “free” to submit to constant monitoring of their bodies and 
minds; “free” to blame themselves for the injuries visited upon them by authorities; “free” to 
obsessively accumulate tokens of intellectual compliance; “free” to be discriminated against on 
the basis of race, class, gender, and sexual orientation; “free” to endure a stultifying pedagogical 
regimen of study skills; and so on.  In the perverse logic of the school, the demoralization 
experienced by students is proof of their freedom, since this demoralization is supposed to follow 
from their own poor choices.  In this context, critical pedagogy should in fact be oriented against 
“freedom,” and in favor of solidarity.  Critical pedagogy should propose this question:  What 
senses of self, intellectual commitments, and political projects might we be able to find once we 




 Against the violent abstraction of neoliberalism, which seeks to hold the individual apart 
from society and history and understands freedom as inhering in this imaginary gap, we need to 
counterpose a different definition and vision.  Within a critical perspective, freedom, and 
emancipation are constituted by their opposition to power; they are made real in the process of 
struggle against oppression.  Freedom cannot be protected as a property of the individual, since it 
exists only in the space of contradiction that opposes collective antagonists: the people and the 
rulers. Much less can freedom be identified with “industrial freedom” or the liberty to move and 
compete in markets.  This latter definition is an apotheosis of capitalism, making it the condition 
and goal of human being and creativity.  Neoliberalism’s awful appeal is in its exaltation of the 
actual, its spiritual vindication of the system’s pervasive violence.  If Hayek’s grim philosophy 
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planted the seeds for this vindication, in the present it is everywhere the order of the day. 
Breaking with this religion means not just repudiating its philosophical precepts and principles of 
policy, but also refusing the ways of being that sustain these principles.  A re-imagination of 
freedom is in this way part of the broader project of building different subjects and subjectivities.  
It means looking beyond the narrow neoliberal autonomies that are permitted to us, and the 
isolation and precariousness that accompany them, and instead to a sense of freedom as the 
movement itself of struggle for a different time of life. __________	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